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Background
Undergrad in UK, Postgrad in 
Denmark -- Games focussed. 
Between the two worked in the offshore 
gambling industry. 
PhD at QUT looking at mechanisms for 
regulating online environments.
Today
Less theory, more on the practical 
implications of power relationships 
Particularly focused on dispute 
resolution. 
How models developed in the offshore 
gambling industry could be applied to 
other online environments.
Gambling
Post-up: Player deposits money to 
gamble. Can request balance once 
conditions met (rollover etc). 
Credit: Player enters contractual (in 
theory) agreement to pay after pre-
determined period. 
Recourse varies.
Sources of conflict
Companies ruleset differs from industry 
norms (Tennis sets, decided bets in 
abandonments) 
Players attempting to exploit mistakes 
(bonuses, bad lines, chip dumping). 
Rogue companies refusing to payout 
(rarely resolved).
Company recourse
Credit agencies. 
Legal action (under certain regimes). 
Harassment / Threats (commonly seen 
in US ‘credit’ / ‘local’ bookmakers). 
Rules are codified, so disputes 
frequently handled as if contract.
Player recourse
UK: IBAS (Independant Betting 
Arbitration Service), Gambling 
Commission. 
AU: State Regulators. 
Las Vegas: Nevada Gaming Comission. 
Online: ???? 
Even formal mechanisms aren’t perfect.
IBAS / Totesport
SportsAlive / BetEzy
ACT Regulated - In theory. 
Submitted Financial Reports showing 
they were solvent as recently as March. 
Bankrupted in 2011. Account holders 
treated as “unsecured creditors”, 
minimal return predicted. Liquidator 
claims insolvent since 2008.
Power
Power is perhaps most 
closely related to who 
is holding the $, but 
even then recourses are 
uneven. 
How might we re-
address the balance?
Offshore
Books based in countries such as: 
Antigua, Panama, Costa Rica. 
Targeting US Players, in violation of 
Wire Act, and now UIGEA. Face 
prosecution if return to US (Jay Cohen). 
Formal regulation ineffective. Player 
formed bodies stepped in... 
Offshore
Established a presence, arbitrated. 
Reputation-based regulation.
But also a lot of success
How does it work?
How does it work?
Re-frames the power relationship. These 
player-operated websites, through the 
power of Google / reputation, give players 
the ability to share information. 
In some ways more effective / efficient 
than the formalised processes. 1-2 week 
outcome, published results, significant/
immediate bottom-line impact.
Failure here too...
EnglishSportsBetting - Late 1990s, 
phone betting outfit just stopped paying 
BetPanam - Heavily promoted by 
forums, went all-in on Superbowl (+7.5 
when market 7). Lost. 
BetCascade -- This one is still officially 
running, they just don’t pay anyone.
Gaming
Virtual Worlds have much in common 
with offshore gambling. 
Multi-national. 
Hard to enforce judgments against 
operators/players spread worldwide. 
Lack of clarity around acceptable 
standards, behavioural norms.
Gaming
Two primary sources of conflict: 
Player norms differ from developer 
norms (Eve Microtransactions) 
Players exploit regulatory framework 
(vs provider, or vs. other players) 
To consider either, we need to know the 
norms (a PhD research objective).
Uneven power
Currently, companies hold all the cards. 
Terms normally enable them to close 
accounts: no appeal, no compensation  
Ultimately, can (& have) shut down 
servers at any time (Disney). 
Is that right when VW’s are “Third 
place” with significant social capital?
Recourse
Players have tried through the courts 
(Bragg vs Linden). Untested. 
Companies often have costly arbitration 
clauses (declared unreasonable in 
Bragg) 
Argue players require another 
mechanism, perhaps in-environment.
Potential Solutions
Players & Developers want to avoid top-
down systems 
Hard to implement anyhow multi-
nationally 
Would a self-governance mechanism 
such as the offshore solution work?
